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Introduction
The concept ‘fact’ is often used in relation to events or states of aﬀairs of
the present or the past. Facts conceived of as the way things are in the present
supports correspondence theory of truth and has no room for the future (often
conceived as events or states of aﬀairs yet to be present). Facts conceived as the
way things were in the past cohere with the interpretations of states of aﬀairs or
events in the present. If any situation arises in the present that negates facts of the
past, the facts in question that are negated by the present situation are considered
as erroneous/false. Therefore, present states of aﬀairs or events determine facts
of the present or accepted facts of the past.
We make propositions about the future. All our future events are couched in
propositions about the future. Football matches, examinations, interviews, wedd-
ings, travels, etcetera are all planned against the future. But these programmed
events about the future are not normally accepted as facts. It is often taken for
granted that there are no future facts. The reasons for this lie squarely in the
conceptions of facts and future. If facts are nothing more than the events or
states of aﬀairs present before us or that we have experienced in the past, then
the events or states of aﬀairs we are yet to experience cannot be facts. Also, our
conception of the future is one that is bedeviled with contingency, that is, it may
come to pass or it may not come to pass. So it makes perfect sense in the case of
contingency not to attribute fact to something that has the propensity to fail to
become an event or state of aﬀairs.
But are we justiﬁed in our conception of fact and future? Are our conception
of fact and future not biased? This paper takes a critical look at our conceptions
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of fact and future. It argues for a conception of fact that embraces the future.
It also makes a distinction between the future conceived from the perspective
of nature taken as a whole, and our planned and determined-to-achieve future.
Consequently, it argues in favour of the possibility of future facts concerning our
planned and determined-to-achieve future with adequate machineries put in place
to achieve it.
What are facts?
In the Dictionary of Philosophy (2000: 192), Mautner traced the concept ‘fact’
to its Latin origin – factum, meaning a deed or something done, and proceeded
to give examples of how the concept ‘fact’ is currently used. This deﬁnition of
fact by Mautner can be understood only in the present (a deed or something
done presently) or the past (a deed or something done in the past). It certainly
cannot incorporate the future. To incorporate the future it has to be redeﬁned as
‘a deed or something that will be done’. Unfortunately, Mautner did not include
the future in his deﬁnition of fact from its Latin origin.
Stanley Rosen (2000: XV) is of the view that facts are how things are. His
deﬁnition restricts facts to the present situation (here and now), and is silent about
how things were in the past, and completely eliminates how things will be in the
future. Rosen’s silence about the past may be due to the common experience we
sometimes have of some of our ideas or pictures of how things were in the past that
have changed in the light of how things are in the present. Some of our facts about
the past have been modiﬁed or changed, or have completely been abandoned due
to current events or experiences now taken to be facts. Our facts of the past are
facts to the extent they cohere with facts of the present. So, facts of the present
determine or stipulate our accepted facts of the past. This may explain why Rosen
is silent about how things were in the past, and does not take into cognizance how
things will be in the future. So, do we accept Rosen’s deﬁnition of facts – ‘how
things are’ – to stand for how we perceive and understand things here and now
even though this perception and understanding may change in the future? And
when present facts stipulate facts of the past and make us retain facts of the past
or abandon them, what is the guarantee that facts that will unfold in the future
will not make us accept as facts events we have hitherto rejected as facts?
In relation to propositions, Michael J. Loux (2006: 142) stated that the
standard answer to the question what facts are is that “facts are those things
in the world that make true propositions true.” He added that true propositions
correspond to some items in the world, and facts in the phrase of ‘it is a fact’,
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‘it is the case’, etcetera make propositions true. Thus facts are entities; a fact is
“a categorically distinct and separate thing” (Loux, 2006: 143). Facts become
things that are the case couched in noun phrases in the form of declarative
sentences. Can we infer from Loux that propositions about the future will
correspond to some items in the future world? If yes, do we then suspend
judgement about propositions about the future until the future becomes present
and the items they correspond to become present, since correspondence deals
with present facts? If our answer is also yes, then following Loux we cannot talk
of future facts.
However, Charles E. Whitmore (1935: 372) deﬁned fact in a more compre-
hensive way. He deﬁned fact as “anything of which we can say that we do not
see why it should be otherwise.” This deﬁnition of Whitmore does not pretend
to know things as they are. It is base on human judgement devoid of reasons to
the contrary. Also, Whitmore’s deﬁnition does not categorically restrict fact to
the present even though it seems to suggest so. In other words, if I have no good
reasons to say that something is not as I conceive it to be, then that thing (event,
idea, conception, state of aﬀairs, and etcetera) will be a fact in the present. It
will remain a fact in the past if there are no reasons to the contrary. And, if
the thing has to do with the future, it will be a fact unless we have reasons
to the contrary.
Modifying Whitmore’s deﬁnition of fact, we deﬁne fact as any human
judgement of anything of the present, past or future, inferred from the present of
which we can say we do not have any good reasons why it should not be so.
Sources of facts
Like sources of knowledge, all facts, including ‘immediate’ facts of perception,
do not come from a single source. The ﬁve external senses, for instance, present
to us diﬀerent kinds of facts. For facts about sound we rely on our ears; and for
facts about colours, shapes and sizes we rely on our sight (eyes). Other sources
of facts include reason, consciousness, authority, memory, and etcetera. So, the
body of accepted facts from which we carry out our actions and thoughts do not
all come from the same source. There are diversities and complexities of facts
ranging from behavioural patterns, historical events and nature in general. Alex
Oliver (2005: 266) listed three theoretical roles for facts which can help us know
the sources of facts. First, they are what true sentences refer to as in ‘the cat sat
on the mat’. Second, they are the truth-makers of truth sentences as in ‘the cat
sat on the mat’ is based on the truth that the cat actually sat on the mat. Third,
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as ‘causal relata’, as in ‘Caesar died because Brutus stabbed him.’ From Oliver’s
analysis, we can infer that ‘facts’ can be used for statements referring to states
of aﬀairs or non judgemental analysis of events in so far as we do not have any
reason to believe that we are being deceived by one’s source of fact. Facts can also
be used for propositions that convey truth if there are no reasons to think that
the propositions are false. Facts can also be used for rational judgements which
are logically deduced about events or states of aﬀairs.
While events or states of aﬀairs are more or less at the present, factual
propositions conveying events or states of aﬀairs can be of the present (as in ‘we
are having an examination’), can be of the past (as in ‘we had an examination
yesterday), and can be of the future (as in ‘we have an examination tomorrow’).
Characteristics of facts
From Charles E. Whitmore’s “Self-Warrant; The Criterion of Fact”
(1935: 372), the following two characteristics of facts can be deduces.
(1) Change of Status: One major characteristic of fact is that it can change
its status. With time a fact may be absorbed into a general notion or change
its nature in the acceptance of another fact. A fact may even be a fact for
a given issue and cease to be for another issue. Richard DeWitt (2004: 32)
gave an example of a fact that changed or ceased to be in the history of
science. He said that from Ancient Greeks till 1600s it was an established
fact that the planets and heavenly bodies “moved with perfectly circular
and uniform motion” round the earth based on the belief that the heavenly
bodies were made of the element ether that essentially moves in perfect
circular and uniform motion. With Isaac Newton came the opposing fact
that the heavenly bodies, including the earth, moved round the sun and are
not perfectly circular in motion.
(2) Probability: Another characteristic of fact is that it is probable. Any
supposed fact is probable in relation to the degree it is true or false. A fact is
accepted as such if it conforms to some related previously accepted facts (now
in the past) or if it resolves more problems or puzzles than previously accepted
facts (as is the case with scientiﬁc facts). The probabilistic nature of facts
makes what facts are, what we think about them, and what we should do with
them problematic. Whitmore (1935: 373) concludes that “no fact is absolutely
certain when once it is submitted to veriﬁcation, and that ‘factuality’ is really
an ideal.” One meaning that can be deduced from Whitmore’s statement is
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that we may have an idea of what fact is, but the fact we experience is fact
according to the degree to which it is related to our idea of fact. And, as we
acquire more knowledge, the facts we have experienced change their status.
This change of status is so dynamic that present facts quickly become past
facts, and past facts may be absolved or swallowed up as more recent facts
emerge in the future.
At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that not all facts are empirical. Some
other facts are philosophical/conceptual. Let us now look at the diﬀerence between
empirical facts and philosophical/conceptual facts as we continue our search of
the possibility of future facts.
Empirical facts and philosophical/conceptual facts
The scientiﬁc method aims at ascertaining empirical facts. These empirical
facts are derived by the ﬁve external senses, aided by scientiﬁc instruments. These
empirical facts are used to derive scientiﬁc hypotheses, theories and laws using
the method of induction.
The logical positivists, committed to a scientiﬁcally empirical account of
reality, have reduced facts to only that which is empirical. A. J. Ayer (1959)
pointed out the causal relationship between facts and propositions. He stated
that facts allow us assert propositions because facts and propositions are causally
connected:
The relation, it may be said, between the proposition ‘I am in pain’ and the fact
that veriﬁes it is that the fact cause me to assert the proposition, or at any rate to
believe it. That such a relation often exists is not to be denied (Ayer, 1959: 242).
Hans Hahn (1959) examined the debate between rationalist and empiricists
over a priori and a posteriori propositions and the relation these have to logic and
mathematics (1959: 151). He quarried the general conception that observation
produces certain facts that reason formulates as the general laws of nature.
This formulation of reason is in logical and mathematical forms. Thus thought
(reasoning) is presented as having a much more modest function than observation.
He contends that this view of thought (reasoning) is mystical and theological.
Finally, Hahn settled for a purely empirical standpoint on our knowledge of
concrete things: “observation is the only source of knowledge of facts: there is
no a priori knowledge about matters of facts, there is no ‘material’ a priori”
(Hahn, 1959: 152).
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From the perspective of the logical positivists, it seems there are only
empirical facts. But Richard DeWitt (2004) speaks of philosophical/conceptual
facts; and concepts are a product of reasoning. DeWitt makes a distinction
between empirical facts and philosophical/conceptual facts. Empirical facts
are “supported by direct, straightforward, observational evidence” (DeWitt,
2004: 31), like I perceive a pencil on my desk and I am touching it and even
smelling it.
On the other hand, philosophical/conceptual facts are based on our belief
about the world or the way we perceive the world in general. Philosophical/
conceptual facts are the roots of our empirical facts. For instance, a pencil a person
puts in her drawer and she believes the pencil is in her drawer though she does
not now perceive it, has some philosophical/conceptual facts as roots to her belief.
DeWitt puts it this way:
Our conviction about the sort of world we live in – our belief that the world consists
largely of stable objects that remain in existence even when not being observed –
is the root of our belief that there is a pencil in the drawer. (2004: 31)
Previously held beliefs (or those of our predecessors) based on facts that are
now shown or proven to be mistaken/false are no longer referred to as facts. But,
as DeWitt rightly pointed out, the words ‘assumption’, ‘beliefs’, ‘opinions’ are
inadequate for our previously held beliefs (or those of our predecessors) based
on facts that are now shown to be mistaken/false because in the context of the
time they were justiﬁed beliefs. In fact, our previously held beliefs and those of
our predecessors based on facts that are now proven to be mistaken/false were as
justiﬁed in the context of the time as our present beliefs based on current facts
are justiﬁed.
Also, DeWitt argued that though we often make a distinction between ‘facts’
and ‘beliefs’, but there is no clear distinction between them within one’s own
worldview. “Strongly held and well supported beliefs appear, from within one’s
worldview, to be facts” (2004: 34). The point being made here is that some
pre-supposed (purported) empirical facts are based on philosophical/conceptual
convictions about the world rather than on the way the world really is. So, when
our previously strongly held beliefs or those of our predecessors (past) turns out
to be mistaken/false in the present, or our currently strongly held beliefs (present)
turn out to be mistaken/false in the future, we will continue to refer to them as
philosophical/conceptual facts, to remind ourselves, in DeWitt terms, that “from
within the relevant worldview, these were much more than mere assumptions,
beliefs, or opinions” (2004: 34)
It is easier to distinguish empirical facts from philosophical/conceptual facts
when looking at past cultures than when looking at the culture in which we
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currently live. This is because within our own time frame they both simply look
like fact to us on the same par. Only through careful reﬂection and great diﬃculty
can we see that “some beliefs we hold are more empirically based, and some are
more philosophical/conceptual” (DeWitt, 2004: 36).
DeWith is making a case for facts of the past. He is of the view that they
should remain as facts within the worldview they were produced just as our facts
of the present are facts within the worldview they are produced. So, a future
change in worldview may invalidate current facts but they remain facts conceived
from within the current worldview. In other words, DeWitt does not allow us
judge as incorrect/false past facts from within the current worldviews. We should
simply refer to past facts as facts within the worldview that produced them, and
if they do not ﬁt into the facts of our current worldview, we simply state that they
do not now ﬁt while retaining their fact status. But can we infer from DeWitt that
we can call future programmed events facts even when they may not be realized?
To answer this question, let us ﬁrst examine our conception of future.
What is future?
What do we mean by ‘future’? The future is often conceived as that which
may be or may not be. This conception is contingent. And issues concerning
contingency about the future is as old as Aristotle’s ‘sea-battle tomorrow’
(Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 9). Aristotle was concerned with truth
or falsehood of propositions which can be established about the present and the
past. But as for the future, truth or falsehood of proposition is problematic. Some
persons try to solve the problem from the perspective of the law of excluded
middle. However, this paper looks at the possibility of future facts. It is not dealing
with whether or not facts (of the past, present, or future) have the characteristics
of being true or false. This paper is concerned with whether or not we can talk
of future facts in the same way we talk of past facts or present facts. Whether
facts of the past, present or future can be true or false will be the subject of
another paper.
The contingency nature of the concept of future can lead us to look at the
future from two perspectives: (1) The future of the whole of nature in general,
that is, the future that is unknown to us as nature keeps unfolding, and (2) The
future as we have planned it to be from facts of the past and facts of the present.
The future of the whole of nature in general is unknown to us. All we know
about the future of the whole of nature in general include certain unpredictable
facts. The natural sciences are yet to fully tell us all there is to know about nature.
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They discover new things about nature, and come up with new theories by the
day. This is because nature is constantly unfolding.
The future as we have planned it to be from facts of the past and facts of
the present is restricted to human persons and not the whole of nature in general.
Being restricted to human persons only, it deals with decisions and plans about
our future. To a large extent, the future that is restricted to human persons is
more certain than that of nature in general.
So, while the future means what nature in general will unfold in days to come
on the one hand, it also means our plans as human persons for days ahead of us on
the other hand. Surely, these two ways of comprehend the future go hand in hand.
For J. H. Randall (1939: 463), our future is not what will be. That is,
our future is not what nature will unfold irrespective of the actions of human
persons. “Our future is rather the determined possibilities of the present, what is
predictable on the basis of our analysis of it.” From Randall’s analysis we can infer
that from present facts we make predictions of future facts. These predictions we
make, irrespective of what nature in general unfold in the future, are our future.
Our present contain some indeterminate and unpredictable factors and tendencies
(since we are still studying nature to fully comprehend it). However, it is form
the facts of the present we experience and analyze that we modify facts of the
past and derive facts of the future. And just as our present facts contain some
indeterminate and unpredictable factors and tendencies (especially of nature in
general) so also is future facts taken as a whole (both that of unfolding nature
and our determined-to-achieve events). But only the future we can predict, says
Randall, is our future. The future as a whole (which include that of nature in
general) cannot be predicted by us. Our future which we can predict from our
present facts Randall calls “the envisaged future.”
Randall’s ‘envisaged future’ connotes prediction of the future. At this
juncture, it is important we distinguish between predictions about the future
and facts about the future.
Predictions and facts of the future
When we make factual claims of the present we are not just predicting. We
are making claims beyond predictions. If there are future facts, then they should
be more than mere predictions of the future.
Predictions about the future include empirical facts about nature in general
and philosophical/conceptual facts. These empirical facts about nature in general
are probable in nature because nature is constantly unfolding itself. Hence, we are
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constantly updating our knowledge of nature. The constant unfolding of nature,
therefore, makes predictions about the future very improbable.
However, facts of the future include empirical facts about our planned
and determined-to-achieve events, and philosophical/conceptual facts. Our de-
termined-to-achieve events, coupled with machineries put in place to achieve them,
are our future facts. And such future facts share the same status as facts of the
present, and facts of the past.
The reason why predictions about the future are often equated with facts of
the future is because of our forgetfulness to make a distinction in our conception
of the future. Although Randall makes the distinction, he failed to notice that
our planned and determined-to-achieve events of the future are more than being
envisaged. Machineries are often put in place to achieve them by all means. So,
our future is that which we are determined-to-achieve with machineries put in
place toward achieving it. Such future of ours is more than just being envisaged.
It has the same status as the facts of the past and the facts of the present.
Future facts
With our deﬁnition of facts as any human judgement of anything of the
present, past or future, inferred from the present of which we can say we do not
have any good reasons why it should not be so, and our deﬁnition of our future
as our planned and determined-to-achieve events, coupled with machineries put
in place to achieve them, we can now make a case for future facts.
Our conception of the future is intertwined with the concept of contingency.
In contemporary usage, a contingent statement or proposition “can be true but
does not have to be true” (Mautner, 2000: 112). Put in a diﬀerent way, a contingent
proposition “is a proposition which, if true, is not a necessary truth and, if false,
is not necessarily false” (Parkinson, 1988: 888). In relation to fact or an event,
a contingent fact or event is one that occurs “without this necessarily being the
case, i. e. it might not have occurred” (Mautner, 2000: 112). So, if a contingent
proposition, fact or event is true, then it is not false even though it could have
been false, and if it is false, then it is not true though it could have been true.
Now, is the concept contingent applicable to future facts or propositions
alone? Empirical facts and philosophical/conceptual facts do undergo changes
and are sometimes abandoned as new scientiﬁc facts (as the history of science
reveals to us) and new philosophical/conceptual facts emerge. Though we are
conscious of the possibility of change in status of facts we continue to accept
empirical facts and philosophical/conceptual facts until new scientiﬁc facts and
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new philosophical/conceptual facts emerge. This, therefore, means that past and
present empirical facts and past and present philosophical/conceptual facts are
probable. They are true or false to certain degree as new facts emerge. Also, in
a sense, they are contingent since they have the propensity of being false as new
facts emerge in the future. It could be argued that empirical facts, if they are
actually facts, cannot be false in the future. But in so far as empirical facts are
derived from sense perception aided by scientiﬁc instruments, and our senses are
imperfect, then there is the possibility that empirical facts could be false as better
scientiﬁc instruments are produced and new facts emerge by the day.
So, facts in general (past, present, and future) are subject to change in status,
probability, and contingency. Past and present facts are constantly threatened
with change of status. But we retain them as facts if we do not now have any
good reason why they should not be referred to as facts, until their status change
in the face of new facts. To avoid bias, we should accept as facts our planned and
determined-to-achieve events, coupled with machineries put in place to achieve
them, if we do not now have any good reasons why they should not be realizable,
until we are not able to realize them when the time they are to be realized in the
future becomes present.
Furthermore, our planned and determined-to-achieve events, coupled with
machineries put in place to achieve them, are more than mere predictions.
Predictions deals with nature in general. Nature in general contains indeterminate
and unpredictable factors and tendencies. Hence the most we can do as humans
is to make predictions all the same with a high degree of probability. Our
planned and determined-to-achieve events, coupled with machineries put in place
to achieve them, fall within areas of our life we can control as much as we possibly
can. They are, therefore, more than mere predictions.
Conclusion
Since facts of the past and the present both have the tendency of being
false as new facts emerge in the future, and they both have the characteristics of
change in status, probability, and contingency, then it will be wrong and nothing
more than a bias not to attribute ‘fact’ to our planned and determined-to-achieve
events in the future, coupled with machineries put in place to achieve them,
simply because they may not eventually come to pass. Just as facts of the past
and the present remain facts until we have good reasons in the face of new facts
to suggest otherwise, so also our planned and determined-to-achieve events of
the future, coupled with machineries put in place to achieve them, remain facts
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(future facts) until we are not able to realize them when the future becomes
present. So, our planned and determined-to-achieve events in the future, coupled
with machineries put in place to achieve them, – scheduled football matches,
examinations, interviews, weddings, outings, travels, holidays, wars, etcetera – are
all facts until we are not able to realize them when the future becomes present.
Summary
Facts are often deﬁned as actual events or states of aﬀairs in the present
or in the past. The future is also often conceived as that which is yet to be an
event or a state of aﬀair. With these conceptions of facts and future it is taken
for granted that there cannot be future facts. The future is bedeviled with
contingency and probability. But a critical look at facts shows that facts, be it
of the past or the present, are also bedeviled with the problem of contingency,
probability, and change in status. So, a critical reformulation of facts coupled
with a conception of future that distinguishes between the that of nature in
general, and our own future, gives room for the idea of future facts. Though
this idea of future facts deals with events or states of aﬀairs yet to be present,
it is valid until the future becomes present and the event in question does not
occur just as present or past facts remain facts subject to new facts that may
render them false.
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